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


ARMY TALKS

RESTRICTED
ETO - U.S. ARMY

THE ARMY IN EUROPE

BY
WALTER LIPPMANN



Also: **WHY UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER?** by Allan Michie



Here's a B rations tip that claims to make powdered eggs taste like other than powdered eggs. Take the egg powder and add a little water and milk, plus baking powder if you can get any. Grind up your scrap meat and add onions, either dehydrated or regular. Cook in patties like pancakes. The onions kill the eggs, the eggs kill the onions; and the meat gives body.

In a combat area don't take off without telling your NCO where you're going. If you do, the War Department may notify your relatives that you are missing in action.

"Each man should be alert to pick up artillery targets and send the information back to the artillery FO so fire can be brought down on them."

"Don't go sky gazing when the ack ack is going up. I've seen guys get hit with the stuff and it does a mean job. Get under cover and you'll be OK."

Pfc F. Brigante, AAA (AW).



When you leave a replacement center, get a batch of change of address cards. When you get to your outfit, fill them out and mail them. You'll get your mail much quicker that way.

"Up here in the line, we use abbreviations; and the replacements don't seem to know what they mean. S-1 is the Personnel Officer (Adjutant); S-2 is Intelligence; S-3 is Plans and Training; S-4 is Supply; S-5 is the Executive Officer; and S-6 is the Battalion Commander."

Latest German novelty reported from the front is the use of candle-end booby traps. An innocent candle sitting in a wall holder or on a table is the bait. When the wick is lighted, it sets off a powder train, which, in turn, detonates a charge.

Speed of driving is the most important single factor in normal tire wear. When driving under a load at excessive speed, rubber is actually burned off the tire carcasses. Other conditions being equal, it is possible to get twice the mileage out of vehicles at thirty miles per hour than at fifty. Save your speed until you need it.

"In reference to one of your Dec. 2 Combat Tips, it may be faster and more accurate to produce 1/5000 map blow-ups photographically instead of by hand. Should the unit concerned wish to investigate further, I suggest they contact their Army Photo Officer at their Army Hq. or Army Pictorial Service, APO 887, US ARMY."

Sgt G. H. Nichols, Sig Photo Co.



If you still have your impregnated hood, break it out and wear it in the cold weather. It is mighty easy around the ears.

"On enemy infantry use HE, fuze delay, and aim slightly short. Ricochets will often cause low airbursts right over the enemy. Use 50 caliber MG on thinskin vehicles up to 300 yards. Over that distance use 3 inch HE."

"Siege operations indicate that the only effective method of reducing cast steel targets on pillboxes is to use a C-2 explosive charge of 18 pounds or more placed in the embrasure. None of the direct fire weapons (3 inch guns and 155mm howitzers) used were able to penetrate."

"WP can be of great value in village fighting, but a definite plan for its use must be made before the attack begins, and be explained to all elements. WP rounds should hit in or behind buildings. If they hit in front, the enemy can escape in the smoke without being seen."

"When two men are eating R rations, take the cheese from the dinner box and the meat from the supper box. Slice both in half and put the cheese on top of the meat. Put a quarter inch of water in a mess kit, plop the patties in, clamp lid down, and steam until water has boiled for several minutes. The cheese melts down over the meat, making hot cheeseburgers; and the water becomes a delicious broth."





ARMY TALKS

"The purpose of the program is to give the soldier psychological preparation for combat, and a better realization of the import of every phase of his military training. Emphasis will be placed on combat orientation. The mental and physical conditioning of the enemy and a proper evaluation of the enemy's weapons and fighting qualities will be stressed. A better understanding of the background of the war, and the soldier's responsibilities in the post-war world will also be developed."

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL EISENHOWER.

(Extract from letter ETO. 1 August, 1944, AG 352/2 OpSS, Subject: Combat Orientation Program).

THE Army in Europe



Approximately every twelfth letter from ARMY TALKS' readers winds up: "Why doesn't somebody tell it to the people back home?"

ARMY TALKS is a Restricted publication, which means that it neither can be quoted in the civilian press nor be sent to other than military personnel. But the story is getting back.

Walter Lippmann, author of U.S. FOREIGN POLICY and widely syndicated columnist, recently returned to the United States from a visit that covered the European battlefronts. ARMY TALKS has the privilege of publishing his report to the US... a remarkably clear picture of the accomplishment of the armies from June to mid-December, and of the problems that face General Eisenhower in the follow-through to final victory.

SOMETHING momentous, and so radically new that we can only begin to realize its consequences, is now being demonstrated in Western Europe by the forces of the United States. Never before has anyone crossed an ocean in order to challenge on its own soil a nation which is comparable in military power with Germany. There have, of course, been countless expeditions overseas both from Europe to the Americas and from America to many parts of the world. But never before has a well-defended continent been invaded from across the seas. Napoleon at the zenith of his military greatness, and Hitler at his, were

unable to cross the English Channel; in 1917 the American armies disembarked on the friendly soil of France.

Men had in fact come to believe that against a powerful country it was impossible to cross the ocean and wage war. No people believed this more than we did. For well over a hundred years our attitude toward the rest of the

world has been determined by the conviction that transoceanic war could not be conducted successfully against a first-class power. The belief that what happened in Europe did not vitally concern the United States rested finally upon the belief that armies could not cross an ocean, land on a well-defended coast, and then build up enough strength to fight a full-scale campaign. Yet this very thing which was believed to be impossible is now being done, and the sheer fact that it is being done will surely alter the course of history, and of American thought and feeling, more than the terms of the settlement—largely provisional and temporary—which are laid down when the fighting ends.

That it is now possible to wage war across an ocean is by all odds, it seems to me, the most revolutionary demonstration of modern times. It is agreed that air power, that the flying bombs and the rockets, that radar, submarines, armored vehicles, are only at the beginning of their development, and that if the scientists continue to devote their best energies to perfecting them, there is no telling now how deadly, how long in range, and how surprising, warfare will become. But it is more deeply significant than all these particular weapons, though it comprehends them all, that the full military power of a modern nation can now be exerted across the oceans, from one continent to another continent.

We Prove America Could Be Invaded

Fortunately for us it is we, rather than our enemies, who have been the first to carry out the military operation which almost everyone believed was impossible



For if we can invade the European continent now, and the Asiatic continent later, then no one can ever again argue that North and South America cannot be invaded. In war the advantage of being the first to use a new weapon, or a new tactic is great. But it is temporary. And so in our military and foreign policy we must now assume that what Americans are doing, others can also some day do if once again we neglect our defenses and our alliances, and cease to be vigilant.

The difference between Eisenhower's task and Pershing's is radical. In 1917-18 the United States intervened before the enemy had conquered Western Europe. Pershing was able, therefore, to land at friendly ports; he had available the facilities of a well-organized country; he had a year to organize his forces on the continent before he sent them into the line alongside powerful Allied armies. The Americans of 1918 played the part of powerful and decisive reinforcements.

The Problem in 1944

In 1944, on the other hand, our intervention came after the original allied armies of Western Europe had been destroyed, at a time when the western allies were no longer able to muster large new armies. The American intervention came at a time when the continent was in enemy hands. Eisenhower had, therefore, to begin fighting before he could land a soldier on the continent. He had to conquer the ground on which his army could stand. He had to build up his army and its equipment within range of the enemy's guns, not safely behind the protection of a well-established and distant front line. He had to develop his forces


in a country which had in a military sense been devastated, in order to paralyze the enemy, by the French patriots and by our own air forces. He had to attack the enemy by moving through a country which the enemy did its best to wreck in the path of his advance.

Yet less than six months after the first troops went ashore on the beaches of Normandy, Eisenhower has an army hammering at the western defenses of Germany.

We can best measure the achievement, and its present difficulties, by understanding the strategy of the German defense.

German Strategy

The German General Staff, it is now evident, knew quite well that, if ever the armed industrialism of the United States could be brought to bear against them, they were lost. Whatever Goebbels may have told the German people, the high command knew that their only hope was to stop us before the full weight of our power could be brought into play. Their first line defense was, of course, the submarine campaign. When the British and American navies and air forces had won the battle of the Atlantic, their next defense was in the ports of France. Knowing that the coast of France is much too large to be defended everywhere, and that we could certainly land somewhere, the German defense consisted in holding, till they were blasted out of it, every great port—of demolishing the port when they had to give it up, of making as complete a wreck as possible of the railways which led from the ports to the front, and of removing or destroying most of the French railway cars and locomotives and repair shops.



The Germans calculated that in this way General Eisenhower would never be able to put ashore soon enough sufficient men and equipment to withstand the German armies which were already in France. It was a reasonable calculation. But the British and American staff which planned the operation had anticipated the German scheme of defense, and had with great ingenuity invented a means of defeating it. This was the device of building artificial harbors at the beaches. In spite of a storm last June which did great damage, these artificial harbors worked so successfully that the Allies brought in a much greater force more quickly than the Germans thought was possible. This initial Allied force proved to be strong enough to conquer room in Normandy for more forces and to capture the port of Cherbourg. This success enabled the army to grow until it was strong enough to break through the Germans at the end of July and then to surround and to destroy and capture over a million enemy troops.

The Measure of Victory

Measured in terms of ground gained, the speed with which it was gained, and of enemy troops put permanently out of action, the campaign across France, Bel-

gium, and Luxembourg is the greatest allied victory of the war. It raised high hopes that it might prove to be the decisive battle of Western Europe. And indeed it would have been if the dash and fury of General Bradley's armies could have been sustained. For when they halted at the Siegfried line in early September, it was not the Germans in front of them who stopped them.

The forces in front of them were much weaker than the forces they had already defeated in Normandy, in the region between the Seine and the Loire, and at Mons near the border between France and Belgium. Our armies were stopped on the frontier of Germany because they were then 500 miles — by railroads that had been wrecked and by roads on which the main bridges had been destroyed — from the sources of fuel to operate their tanks and trucks and armored vehicles, and from their supplies of ammunition.

Outrunning the Supply Line

They were like a man who has to stop running not because of what is in front of him but because he is winded and has to catch his breath. Naturally — this pause gave the Germans as well a chance to catch their breath, that is to say to man their western defenses, to dig in, to lay down minefields and barbed wire, to recruit new divisions, to turn service troops into combat troops, and to replace a considerable part of the equipment which they had lost in France.

Because their strategic calculation was correct, the German high command were able, in spite of all their losses, to prevent a decision and to prolong the war. They had denied the Allies the use of the great ports of France, had held

on to the ports to the bitter end and had demolished them before surrendering them. The railroads, especially those west of Paris, which is the hub of the French transportation system, had been paralyzed by the Allies; the Germans in their retreat made the damage worse, and destroyed or carried off with them a large part of the French rolling stock and the locomotives. They knew that without ports and railways no modern army can wage offensive war at a long distance from its base of supplies. During the great German retreat in August and September the Allies had only the beaches on which to land supplies and only motor trucks and airplanes to move them. They had only begun to get the use of Cherbourg and the smaller harbors of Normandy and northern Brittany, and they were just beginning to be able to run railway trains from these ports to the region of Paris. What could then be landed in France and moved to the front was not enough to enable the armies to keep moving and to invade Germany.

HAVING been over the line of supply from Cherbourg to the front, and having seen how it was wrecked and what incredible labor and ingenuity the engineers, the transportation and the signal corps, the ordnance and quartermaster have put in to make it workable I cannot in my layman's way grasp how so much was done to supply the armies. I cannot begin to imagine how more might have been done in the critical days of September. To have got enough ashore over those treacherous beaches to knock out a German



army of a million men was a feat that is surely unparalleled in the history of war; to suppose that this miracle could have been topped immediately by a second miracle, which was to be able also to invade Germany without a really good port to land supplies and without a railway to carry them, is, so it seems to me, to suppose the impossible.

As a matter of fact it took only two months after the campaign of France to organize the present campaign for Western Germany. I wish I had the power to describe the work that has been done by Americans in Europe this autumn. Yet we must try in order that we at home do not become separated by too great a lack of understanding from these two millions and more of our bravest and best.

Understanding the Job

For these men need and they are entitled to have not only what we can produce and send them, and not only prayers for their safety and their triumph, but also a constant realization of what in fact they are doing. It is natural enough, no doubt, that we should think of war in terms of the ground gained and of the price paid for it in blood. But in fact this war is a prodigious labor of men working forward against the

obstacles of nature and of the enemy. In a sense which at first it is hard for a civilian to appreciate, the successes announced in the communiqués and the cost announced in the casualty lists are to the army itself the results and consequences of the grinding task of doing innumerable jobs and of fitting them together correctly.

I wish I could describe the forethought, the preparation, the disciplined cooperation, the improvisation and the endless work of brain and hands which have made it possible for so large an army to live, to work, and to fight its way forward so far from home. Perhaps the observation of a Frenchman will help the reader to imagine the operation. My friend had seen many armies, had seen the Germans enter France, had lived under the Germans for four years, had seen the American Army as it moved through France last summer. "You won't misunderstand me," he said, "when I say that your Americans do not look and act like soldiers as we Europeans expect soldiers to look and act." I asked him what they did look like. "They looked," he said, "like armed working men in a gigantic industrial plant on wheels rolling along and knocking down and blasting away and running over whatever got in their way. I felt as if the Americans were digging the Panama Canal right through the German army."

WORK, the interlocking labor of millions of men, is the means by which the American power, with the infantry and the airmen out front breaking open holes for it, is advancing into Germany. In this war it is not true that some men fight and other men work. The soldier works all the time, and then he fights that he may gain new ground to work farther on. The work of the army never stops. It went on night and day through what appeared at a distance to be a period when there was no "news" of anything in particular, and it is upon the foundation of this endless work that the present battle in Western Germany has been organized.

Delivering Power

The purpose of the work was to bring up to the front against the enemy the military power which the people of the United States have been creating since 1940. The issue between the Germans and ourselves has been whether we could deliver on the battlefield the military power which we are able to generate in the United States. Last summer we proved that we could deliver it in France. Since the summer campaign the task of the army has been to prove that we could deliver our power inside of Germany.

To deliver it in France the Allies had to defeat the German navy



and the German air force and to break the Atlantic Wall. To deliver our power in Germany we have had during the travail of this autumn to make France, which we had deliberately made unusable to the German army, usable again for our army. For in order to defeat the Germans in France we bombed, bombarded and sabotaged everything an army needs if it is to move and fight. Then, having defeated the Germans in France, we had to turn around and repair the very facilities we had done our best to wreck, plus those which the Germans destroyed. Until September four nations, the British, the French, the Americans, and the Germans, did their utmost to make France a country in which an army could not move and could not fight. Since September the work has been done of making France a country through which an allied army could move to invade what was once the greatest military power on earth, what is still a country so profoundly militarized that it makes up in toughness and cunning and battle experience for its dwindling manpower and material resources.

The Battle of Germany

The battle which is now being fought on the borders of Germany is a far greater and a far more difficult battle than any of the battles of last summer. For the



landing in Normandy we were able to employ the overwhelming allied superiority of the allied navies and air forces. The ground armies were close to their base of supplies in Germany, and their lines of communication were for the most part blocked by the sabotage of the French Forces of the Interior and by our own airmen. When we broke out of the Normandy peninsula our superiority in planes, tanks, trucks, and mobile artillery had full effect. For the ground was hard and the weather was clear.

The Situation Now

General Bradley's armies, which are carrying the main burden of the present offensive, are in a very different position. The fog and rain of November and December prevent us from using to anything like full capacity our great superiority in tanks and armored vehicles. For these reasons the burden of the battle is being borne by the infantry and the artillery. It is a battle in which the artillery has to bombard the German defenses so that the infantry can seize new ground, and so enable the artillery to move forward a bit farther.

The essential thing to keep in mind and to take to heart, is that we are fighting to break into Germany at a season of the year when the weather neutralizes to a very large degree two of the weapons — airplanes and armored vehicles — in which we have the greatest superiority. We are seeking to fight the decisive battle west of the Rhine with the infantry and artillery. This is the basic reason why the German defense is so difficult to crack, why our casualties in the infantry regiments are

so heavy, and why artillery ammunition of certain calibres is being used faster than our rate of production. For in this particular battle the artillery has been called upon to do not only its own task but also a very large part of the task of the air force and of the tanks.

If this same battle could have been fought in the normally dry clear summer weather of July and August, there is almost no doubt whatever that the German resistance would have been crushed swiftly and decisively. It is only because the Germans are able to pit their infantry and artillery against ours on the relatively narrow front where Germany can be invaded that they have equality on the battlefield.

Shortages

It should, however, be clearly understood that our troops have not been sent into this battle with a shortage of ammunition or of any other essential supplies. The supplies exist for this battle itself and they have been brought forward and are in the hands of the troops. If the objectives of this battle can be attained by the infantry and artillery, they will be attained. At the beginning of the battle that was, I may say, the view of our responsible commander in charge of the offensive. At the front there is not a shortage of certain kinds of artillery ammunition for this particular battle. The shortage is in the reserves, which must be kept full for the battles which will follow this one, either to exploit a breakthrough if it is achieved or to renew the attack if this battle is indecisive.

When we realize that we are fighting this battle without being



able to use all our armed superiority, the question naturally arises whether the battle had to be engaged now when the weather immobilizes us to such a degree both in the air and in the open country. What I have said about the supply problem and the German strategy in the French ports explains why the attack on Germany could not begin any sooner than it has. Could it have been postponed until next spring or summer? The High Command, which realized to the full the disadvantages and the costs of a winter campaign, decided that the disadvantages of a long pause were even greater.

Why a Winter Campaign?

What were they? We can understand them only by realizing that Germany is not, despite so many reports to the contrary, a fatally wounded animal which would lie there prostrate and passive while we prepared at our leisure to deliver the mortal blow. Germany is fatally wounded in the sense that she cannot avoid eventual defeat because she no longer has the manpower or the resources to match the whole allied superiority. But Germany is not prostrate; on the contrary, her recuperative power is very great. That is why again and again she has been able to rebuild and repair the industries which we have bombed. That is why she has been able to restore



not only the size of her fighter air force, but to develop an increasing number of new fighter planes which are technically superior to our own.

The Germans are still able to make exceedingly effective use of any pause in the fighting. If, for example, they had had another six months to perfect the robot bomb against England, it is not pleasant to think what might have happened. Nor is it altogether agreeable to think now about what they would be able to do with these new weapons if they had another few months to produce them and improve them. Moreover, though the German army has lost an enormous number of men, the German population and the population it controls is still so great, and so enduring and tough, that there are replacements. Given a pause, the Germans are able to recruit and train and to equip new divisions.

"The Last Ounce"

A long winter pause on the western front would have meant, therefore, that Germany would have been able to recover a good deal of strength. The German high command may have been led to do foolish things by Hitler. But when the professional soldiers are in charge, as they were in the battle of France, as they are now in the battle of Germany, one must never assume that they are irrational, that they do not know

what they are doing...we delude ourselves if we think that the German army is not now led by men of extraordinary military experience and imagination...who are capable of extracting the last ounce of military advantage out of their strategical position.

We are pitted against a great and a most dangerous enemy. In the present battle on the western front the recuperative and resisting power of the strongest industrial military power of Europe is locked in a death grapple with the strong, but new, industrial military power of the United States.

The Balance of Forces

Until there is a rupture and a break-through, or unless attrition brings about a pause, the battle is equal. For the power the Germans can exert on a battlefield in Germany is aligned against the power that we can exert across the ocean and over hundreds of miles of France and Western Germany...

If the reader of this report finds it sombre, all I can say is that it is, I believe, a true report which he is entitled to have, and very much needs to have. Having seen what Americans are enduring abroad, I see no reason why we, who are spared so much, should spare ourselves the realization that this is the greatest ordeal, the severest test of their courage, their resolution, and of their spirit, to which the living generation of Americans has yet been subjected.

I found no trace of hesitation, doubt, or faltering, anywhere among the armies. But I did find wonder and doubt, which could become anger and resentment, about whether the civilian population really understands what this war demands of the men who work and fight. No one is complaining

that the people at home are denying to the army what it needs...

The one thing the army do not feel they are getting in full measure is a thing which cannot be produced in factories, but is imponderable and of the spirit. I know of no better short name for it than understanding. They do not feel that we do not think enough about the pain of battle. If anything, the soldiers shrink from too much enervating civilian sentiment about their perils and their wounds. They know too from their letters how intense is the anguish of separation, and the anxiety of the long vigil of their families. What they miss is the feeling that in our public life we act and talk with a sufficient understanding of the magnitude, and not merely of the dangers, of their task.

Realizing the Soldier's Part

For in this struggle of life and death, where some men give their lives and all give a part of their youth and of their happiness and their hopes, there is no reward except the honor and glory of being part of a great enterprise that will always be remembered and celebrated gratefully. There can be no inducement and no repayment except the honor of belonging to an army which has done so well its duty that it will be forever famous in the history of the world. Medals and ribbons for the specially brave and efficient, provisions for all the soldiers when they return, are necessary. But they are not sufficient. Nothing can be sufficient except the feeling now while they are working and fighting, and later when they return, that what they are doing will be understood, will have become part of the heritage of their people, of the legends and history of America.

WHY!

The defeat of Germany is certain. Even the Germans know it — all except a hard core of fanatical Nazis.

Then, why do the German leaders carry on the fight?

The answer can be summed up in two words: **ANOTHER CHANCE!** Another chance to build a strong Germany, to set up a powerful war machine — to conquer the world.

HOW DO THEY THINK THEY CAN WIN THAT CHANCE?

1. By fighting until we get tired of the fight.
2. By fighting so that they can retire from the field "with honor" — and a German Army intact.
3. By making complete victory so expensive that we will agree to a negotiated peace which would give Germany something to build on for the next try.
4. By holding out until propaganda might undermine the Allies' unity of purpose. The Nazis hope to "divide and conquer" even in defeat.
5. As a last resort, to carry on until there is a "break" in the German home front. They would then have a basis for another myth that "the German Army was never defeated."

What is meant by "unconditional surrender"? What does it mean in demands to be made on the Germans... in jobs that have to be done by Allied armies... pitfalls to be avoided during the months that follow the German collapse?

Allan Michie's article, "Why Unconditional Surrender?" explains these questions and shows what is involved.

UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER?



THE first peace aim of the United Nations must be to make certain that the rest of the world will be rendered safe from Germany forevermore. Germany's first bloody attempt to enslave the rest of the world cost mankind 25 million lives directly and indirectly; Germany's second bid has thus far cost the world more than twice that frightful toll.

This time we must not flinch from using our bloodily-won victory, to prevent by force of arms the third German attempt at world domination — a bloodbath that would destroy what remains of our civilization. We must demonstrate to the Germans this time that they are not a superior race, not even in military ability, and that wars of aggression do *not* pay.

"Cooling Off" Period

On the eve of Allied victory there is a widespread and growing conviction, among the men charged with shaping a postwar world that a long "cooling off" period of several years should elapse between the collapse of Germany and the conclusion of a formal peace treaty. Drawing from bitter lessons of the Versailles Conference, when the Allies produced a peace treaty in haste and repented during an era of empty phrases between wars, they hold a view

that a peace treaty should not be signed until the world has had some time to recover from shock, bitterness, and hatred of this conflict.

According to these Allied planners, an interval between Germany's collapse and gradual creation of peace could be covered by fairly comprehensive military agreement which Germany would be forced to accept as the price of unconditional surrender.

The details of these military provisions can better be worked out on the spot by Allied military commanders who will be more familiar with the current military strength of the enemy when Germany surrenders.

Minimum Safeguards

But, if the sacrifices of those who have fallen before the second attempt by Germany's militarists to dominate the earth are not to have been made in vain, then the peoples of the free world must insist that the unconditional surrender agreement contain versions of the following seven points. By those who know their German Enemy, these are regarded as the minimum safeguards without which German militarism will still survive and there will be no peace.

Some of the points have already been agreed to by the European

* Mr. Michie is a staff writer for READER'S DIGEST. "Why Unconditional Surrender?" is an original article, appearing first in ARMY TALKS.



Advisory Commission which has been meeting periodically in London for the past nine months. The Commission is composed of John Winant, United States Ambassador to Great Britain; Fedor Gusev, Russian Ambassador to Great Britain; and William Strang, former Permanent Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain. Other provisions have yet to be approved by Washington, London and Moscow.

But, if we are not to face a third attack on the world by a resurgent and remilitarized Germany within twenty years' time, it is essential that *all* of the following provisions be included in our unconditional surrender terms:

FIRST, unconditional surrender this time must be obtained from the German High Command, not from provisional civilian or semi-military governments. Only by obtaining clear-cut surrender from the German High Command can we prevent revival of the "stab in the back" myth that the German Army remains invincible and was not defeated on the battlefield but was betrayed by a faltering home front.

"The German Army was and is invincible." "The German Army in

1918 was betrayed, 'stabbed in the back' by Socialists, Communists and Jews who allowed themselves to be tricked into Wilson's peace. Had it not been for this treachery on the home front, the Army could have fought on to victory."

That propaganda, designed to save the face of the German Army that was soundly defeated on the battlefield in August 1918, was insistently dinned into German ears and repeated by many unfortunate dupes in Britain and the United States. This myth was adopted by the German Army as the first step in preparing the German mind for new militarism — Germany, in fact rallied her forces for this war with the battlecry that she never lost the last war. We must not let that happen again.

SECOND, upon Allied acceptance of Germany's unconditional surrender, all German troops must remain where they are, allowing Allied armies to pass through them to the occupation of Germany. This provision has a double object. It will prevent large numbers of German soldiers and



officers melting away with their arms and equipment inside Germany where they may later band into private armies and engage in underground and guerrilla warfare. It was thus the *Freikorps* terror gangs, through a combination of murder, intimidation and connivance with regular army men, held large areas of Germany under their control after 1918. This provision also makes certain that this time the defeated German Army will not march back intact to the homeland to be hailed as heroes. After the 1918 Armistice, defeated German forces were allowed to march back into Germany with flying colors under the command of their Imperial Army officers, in their own time, with a five day gap between their rear guards and the advance guard of Allied troops. Thus the German Army managed to preserve much of its glory. It marched through towns where banners greeted them with "*siegreich grussen wir unsere helden*" (victoriously we greet our heroes). Germans were entitled to welcome their menfolk home, but

never in history was such a welcome given as to that defeated German Army.

THIRD, we must insist on military occupation by Allied Armies in every nook and corner of Germany with full equipment, including planes, tanks and heavy guns, in order to make Germany's defeat tangible and visible to all Germans, which we failed to do in 1918. This time we must demonstrate to the German people that the Allies intend to control the country until it is purged of militarism and we must also drive home to the Germans that "decadent democracies," when put to the test have both ingenuity and resources to create and use weapons of war—in other words, the Germans must be shown physical evidence that Germany is *not* the only country that excels in military ability.

FOURTH, demobilization of the German Army must be carried out this time under Allied military supervision and not left in the hands of the German High Com-

mand. After the 1918 Armistice, the job of demobilizing the German Army was left in the hands of Field Marshal von Hindenburg and officers of the Imperial General Staff who were determined to circumvent Allied demands. Much of the German Army was left intact after the Armistice and as late as the summer of 1920, at least twenty thousand professional officers remained in the German Army, grimly planning the next war against the world. The German Army of one hundred thousand men allowed by the Versailles Treaty was never actually reduced to that number—instead, it became a forced training course for officers and soldiers of this war.

A considerable number of German soldiers—probably several million before the fighting ceases—will be in Allied PW camps when the war ends. They must be retained there and released in stages to return to Germany only as fast as conversion from war to peace economy is able to absorb them in useful work. The rest of the German Army, upon its surrender, must be detained by the Allies under prison camp conditions for some time after the surrender while the details of demobilization are worked out—then gradually released.

FIFTH, all German officers and soldiers suspected of or alleged to be guilty of war crimes must be apprehended, tried, and summarily punished. These should include all officers, regardless of rank and prestige, who, as commanders of troops in occupied territories, ordered, approved or condoned atrocities against civilian populations, or who violated the rules of war on battlefield.

must make certain that out of professional regard for fellow officers, American and British military men in particular do not deal leniently with their German opposites.

By passing the entire German Army, on its surrender, through Allied prison camps where officers and men would be registered and their military service docketed, it would be possible to identify and apprehend many war criminals who might otherwise escape justice if allowed to slip back into Germany or abroad.

The above provision, of course, is concerned only with war criminals in the German Army. Over and above this, our unconditional surrender terms must provide for the apprehension, surrender, trial, and punishment of all other German civilians guilty of war crimes.

SIXTH, The supervision of Germany's disarmament should be put into the hands of Allied commissions of control similar to those established in 1918. This time, the commissions should be composed both of military men familiar with ordnance and of industrial experts skilled in detecting camouflaged war production under the guise of peacetime production. These commissions must be provided with adequate staffs of investigators to enable them to make periodic and surprise visits to thousands of German industrial plants during the period of disarmament.

These commissions should have authority to order the dismantling of German arms and aircraft factories or their conversion to peacetime production; to close down temporarily, until adjustment to peacetime economy is made, certain German factories such as

steel, chemical, or heavy engineering plants which have been swollen far beyond Germany's real needs during this war.

SEVENTH, the disarmament of Germany under the supervision of Allied commissions of control should be completed during the period of the occupation of Germany by Allied troops. On completion of their work they could be withdrawn, and a long-term assignment of preventing the remilitarization of Germany and the re-emergence of the German militarism be put into the hands of a permanent Allied investigating body. It was our failure to provide such a permanent organization — failure largely due to Wilson's strong objection to any long-term supervision of Germany — that made German rearmament so easy after the last war. That permanent organization, established with headquarters in Germany and with branch units and investigators stationed in every German city, town and industrial center, would be prepared to function for a generation or more, until such time as the nations charged with the responsibility for keeping peace have satisfied themselves that Germany as a nation and Germans as a people have forever rejected militarism.

It would need several hundred investigators who would operate in civilian clothes to avoid the irritation their uniformed presence might create. The work of these investigators might be supplemented by the findings of Allied intelligence sources, German and non-German, which have functioned with incredible efficiency inside Germany during this war. In addition, German anti-militarists must be encouraged to report any signs of remilitarization and be protected from persecution when they do. In that connection, it will be necessary for the Allies to insist on revision of German laws, which after 1918 permitted German courts to hand out sentences to Germans who informed the Allies of breaches of the Versailles Treaty.


If these essential points are adopted in addition to other purely military demands of our unconditional surrender, there is not the slightest doubt that Germany can be disarmed and that any further efforts at rearming will be quickly brought to light. Thus safeguarded against the rebirth of German militarism, the Allies can proceed without haste or hatred to fashion a peace that will last, a wise peace that will include a new Germany against which protection will be unnecessary.

* * * *

When will we have achieved unconditional surrender? When will Germany be beaten? Would it be impossible for the Germans to start another war if they were forced to accept the seven terms listed in this ARMY TALKS? What would happen if any one of them were not included in the Armistice?

In addition to an unconditional surrender, what must be done to convince the Germans that they don't have superior military ability? That they are not a master race? That the individual does not exist only to serve the state? That their claim to *Lebensraum* is a phony?

These are important questions. They concern not only the future of Germany and Europe, but of the United States and you.



THE I & E Officer for your company will soon receive, through higher headquarters, two 3' x 4' waterproof maps. Care must be taken in the handling of these maps to prevent their being folded; folding cracks the waterproofing. For easy transport the maps may be rolled into a tube.

One map shows Germany and its adjacent areas; the other, the Far East and Southwest Pacific. Maps

LISTEN : Tune in your American Forces Network for a dramatized version of the week's ARMY TALKS.
Time : 1030 Saturday, 20th January, 1945.

Printed by Newnes & Pearson Printing Co., Ltd., Exmoor Street, N. Kensington, London, W.10.



should be mounted firmly on building board, packing-case stock or heavy cardboard; battle lines can be easily marked by home-made arrows, pins, or china marking pencils. Late radio bulletins and daily news clippings should be placed in adjacent spaces, as shown in the drawing above. Correctness of battle lines can be checked weekly in the editorial section of the Saturday STARS AND STRIPES.

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCES

22 Dec 44

ORDER OF THE DAY

To Every Member of the A.E.F.

The enemy is making his supreme effort to break out of the desperate plight into which you forced him by your brilliant victories of the summer and fall. He is fighting savagely to take back all that you have won and is using every treacherous trick to deceive and kill you. He is gambling everything, but already in this battle your gallantry has done much to foil his plans. In the face of your proven bravery and fortitude, he will completely fail.

But we cannot be content with his mere repulse.

By rushing out from his fixed defenses the enemy may give us the chance to turn his great gamble into his worst defeat. So I call upon every man, of all the Allies, to rise now to new heights of courage, of resolution and of effort. Let everyone hold before him a single thought—to destroy the enemy on the ground, in the air, everywhere—destroy him!

United in this determination and with unshakable faith in the cause for which we fight, we will, with God's help, go forward to our greatest victory.

Dwight D. Eisenhower



GENERAL Eisenhower's first Order of the Day was issued as Allied troops stormed the Normandy beaches; his second, on the eve of Allied victory in France. His third, printed above, signals the opportunity for our greatest victory yet.

It is an opportunity which every man and woman in the Army can share. Every drop of gasoline saved . . . every tire pampered to its maximum mileage . . . every piece of equipment kept in tip-top working order . . . every service operation carried out at peak efficiency . . . thousands of little things . . . add up to a big push.

The Germans have come out into the open for a fight. If you, you personally, will look upon the outcome as something that depends largely on your own efforts—they'll get it.