Divisional History
A History of the 90th Division in World War II
6 June 1944
To
9 May 1945
Chapter 6
The Caissons Keep Rolling
The triumph at Chambois ended one phase of the Battle of Europe. The scene shifted rapidly now to another, and the props were arranged for the Battle of Germany. The long fingers of Allied columns extended deeper into France, more landings had been made in southern France, in the Marseilles area, and the enemy found itself surrounded and overwhelmed at every turn. The Germans had reached a state of thorough confusion, and only occasionally was organized resistance encountered.
Riding hard on the heels of the retreating enemy, the 90th spent only a few days in the vicinity of Chambois, days devoted to rehabilitation of personnel and equipment. And now the Division was assigned to the XX Corps and to the Third Army once more. Never again, for the duration of the war, was the 90th to become separated from General Patton’s command, a command which was shortly to create a legend among friend and fore alike for its spirit and bravado, a legend comprising all the elements of Peck’s Bad Boy, Robin Hood, Sir Galahad and the Cannonball Express all rolled into one.
On August 26th the 90th began to move. Swinging slightly south of Paris the combat teams of the Division moved eastward through Fontainbleau and on towards the cathedral city of Reims. The names of disputed battlefields of the previous was were briefly noted and passed . . . the Marne, Chateu Thierry, the Aisne and Reims at last. Verdun and the river Meuse fell to advance elements of XX Corps further to the east.
Early in September, however, occurred the “break” for which the Nazis had been praying. The Allied armies had advanced so rapidly and so far that communication lines were stretched almost to the breaking point. Critical supplies were lacking, gasoline to power the machines of war became a rare and precious commodity. The wheels ground to a reluctant halt at the approaches to German, while the 90th unable to advance further, remained in the vicinity of Reims.
The enemy utilized this time to good advantage. Quickly they threw troops into the Maginot and Siegfried defenses. They manned their fortifications and prepared to defend. No longer confused and bewildered, they were ready to make the most of their natural and man-made fortifications. The stalled Americans, knowing that victory had been almost within their grasp, chafed impatiently and helplessly at the delay.
At last gasoline was available, and the Division moved to the vicinity of Etain, 20 kilometers east of Verdun, the springboard for the push towards the fortress city of Metz. Corps plans called for the 7th Armored Division to lead the attack, followed by the 5th Infantry Division on the Right and the 90th on the left. The mission of the 90th Division was to capture the town of Thionville on the Moselle river, establish a bridgehead over the Moselle, protect the north flank of the Corps, and to take an active role in the ambitious long-range plan to advance eastward as far as Frankfurt-am-Main.
The latter plan was never effected. The Germans had plans of their own, plans which were to make the path to Frankfurt long, tortuous and costly. Almost immediately the enemy showed his hand. A strong enemy reconnaissance force, driving down from the north, re-took the town of Spincourt from elements of the 90th. The town was later recaptured after intense artillery fire had drive the Germans back to the north. Unimportant in itself, the engagement was the first of many and it provided an indication of enemy intentions. The days of precipitant retreat were over. The Germans had had their rest. Now they intended to fight.
From H-hour on September 7th the advancing infantry met opposition, opposition which was brushed aside with an ease bred of confidence and experience. By the day’s end the Division held a line roughly from Trieux to Avril to Briey, more than half the distance from the line of departure.
On that same night the Division CP, near Mairy, was directly menaced by the Nazi 106th Panzer Brigade. Approximately half the panzer force had passed through the area before its presence was discovered. An immediate battle ensued with personnel of Division Headquarters, Signal Company, and Division Artillery fighting back with whatever weapons were at hand. Elements of the 712 Tank Battalion moved into the battle zone to counter the enemy’s armored strength, while two battalions of infantry were called from reserve to aid the destruction of the powerful intruders. Division Artillery headquarters, although almost completely encircled by the enemy, extricated itself its precarious position and moved to a less exposed location.
All through the following day the battle raged and ended late in the afternoon with the utter annihilation of the 106th Panzer Brigade. At the same time the other 90th troops had detected the movement of an entire Battalion of the 559th Division, held its fire until the enemy flank had been exposed, and proceeded to destroy the German forces. By the day’s end little ground had been gained, but the day had nevertheless been profitable when the prisoners and enemy dead and destroyed material were counted up.
During the succeeding days the 90th moved closer to the banks of the Moselle north of the City of Metz, converging inexorably on Thionville. Over hilly terrain, through deep-cut gorges, storming the slippery slopes of vigorously defended strong points, the 90th advanced. One after another the towns of the west Moselle River fell into American hands.
In the north, the advancing V Corps had at least come abreast and now covered the previously exposed left flank of the 90th. In the south the 5th Infantry Division had forced 2 crossings of the Moselle south of Metz, one of which was shortly abandoned. As the perimeter of Metz itself, no progress could be made.
On September 12th the 90th fought its way into the city of Thionville in desperate house-to-house combat, and the following day cleared that portion of the city which lay on the near side of the river. Plans were immediately formulated calling for the bridging of the Moselle at Thionville, although reconnaissance and intelligence indicated the enemy was defending the opposite banks in division strength or more and held ideal positions for defense.
The crossing was not made. Instead, the 90th was ordered to extend southward to the area immediately west of Metz, relieving those elements of the 5th Infantry and the 7th Armored in that area. The relief was duly effected, and the Division’s line now extended from Garche on the north along the river line south to Talange, thence in an arc westward and southward to Gravelotte. As the days passed the reason for the existence of that arc became increasingly apparent. The western approaches to Metz are ringed by an imposing circle of hills, hills which must be taken by storm if at all. On those hills were erected powerful, mutually protecting fortresses capable of withstanding unlimited aerial and artillery poundings. From the fortresses the defenders boasted of ideal observation and an open field of fire. This was the outer ring of defense. Inside that ring lay another similar arc, more powerful, if possible, than the outer. It was against the outer ring of the Metz fortification that the 90th now pressed.
As the difficulties of the reduction of Fortress Metz became evident, the Division altered its plans radically. Frontal assaults on the city, which had successfully resisted such assaults for nearly one thousand years, were out of the question. The new plan called for attacks of limited nature, aggressive patrol, constant nibbling into the impregnable ring.
Throughout the remainder of the month the 90th ground steadily into the edges of the strongly—defended arc. Gains were small and indecisive. On the other, hand, all efforts of the enemy to throw the Division back were unsuccessful and highly expensive. September drew to a close with the Third Army stalemated along the banks of the Moselle with the enemy holding firm. To the south the 5th Division was making little or no progress with its bridgehead over the Moselle. The nutcracker around Metz had not yet been squeezed tightly enough.
In the north, the town of Maiziers-les-Metz, ten kilometers from Metz itself, barred the northern approached to the enemy bastion. Accordingly, it was determined that Maiziers-les-Metz must be taken in order to improve the Division’s lines. On October 7th the 2nd Battalion 357th Regiment, initiated its attack on the town. By the day’s end approximately half the town had been taken, but resistance in the form of street barricades, thickly strewn mines, violent mortar and artillery fire and grim house-to-house defense made complete occupation of Maiziers-les-Metz a difficult if not impossible task.
So vital did the Germans consider this northern outpost that a constant flow of reinforcements poured into the town. This added enemy strength plus the serious shortage of ammunition made further progress tedious and slow. No all-out effort was made, therefore, to reduce Maiziers-les-Metz in one crushing blow. Instead, a new plan was evolved. The contested city was to be made a practical training ground in which new methods of street fighting were to be perfected. Deliberately calculated attacks with deliberately limited objectives by companies, platoons and squads were launched. Experiments were attempted, lessons learned or rejected, in this, the most practical war college in the world.
In the meantime, those elements of the Division not actually engaged in Maiziers-les-Metz devoted themselves to intensive training and rehabilitation. With an eye already focused on the highly mysterious, highly publicized Siegfried Line, methods and techniques of reducing pillboxes were studied, demonstrated, perfected, practiced and rehearsed. New dispositions of Corps and Divisions were made along the front, with the 90th remaining essentially in place on the outer rim of the defensive arc west of Metz. On October 15th Brigadier General James A. Van Fleet took command of the Division.
For more than a month the front lines had remained almost static. The situation at Maiziers-les-Metz, however, grew intolerable. It was unthinkable that the town should be jointly occupied by Americans and Germans, living, so to speak, in each others laps. The XX Corps at last determined that the town was of sufficient importance to warrant the extra effort and munitions required to clear it of the enemy, straddling, as it did, the vital supply lines feeding the northern fort of Metz.
Plans for the assault were made with infinite attention to the minutest details. Each officer, each rifleman, knew his job and his objective. In the center of the town was the city hall, strongly defended and well fortified by the enemy. The city hall became the hub upon which the German defense revolved, a symbol of failure or success. Whoever held the city hall held Maiziers-les-Metz. On October 27th the attack was set in motion. Four groups of ten men each attacked the city hall from four directions. Only one group of men could gain access to the interior. A sharp hand to hand fight developed, and nine of the original ten were wounded. The remaining solider scorned all demands for surrender, and instead covered the retreat of his wounded comrades.
On the next day and the next attack was continued. The infantry moved behind a protective screen of artillery often only 75 yards to their front in skillfully coordinated moves. At last the town was cut in tow, the confused enemy found itself cut off with no path of escape. Routed and demoralized by the accurate artillery fire and the skill with which each unit functioned, the entire remaining elements of the garrison surrendered. The city hall had fallen, and Maiziers-les-Metz was firmly in American hands. An entire enemy battalion had been destroyed, while the 90th suffered only 55 casualties.
The preliminaries had ended. The next target was Metz . . . and more. The taking of the important bastion was to be merely an incident in a large plan, a plan which envisioned the utter annihilation of all enemy troops between the Moselle and the Saar river. Carefully the plans were laid, carefully and shrewdly. Munitions and supplies had now accumulated in sufficient quantities. This time there was to be no error.
The objective was important enough to require the intimate attention of America’s finest troops. And the 90th, only a few months ago unknown and untried, read an enemy description of the T-O Division:
“The enemy (the 90th) no longer considers combat a sport but fights fanatically to hold his territorial gains. The morale of its troops is good, and he attacks vigorously, even in the face of losses. In wooded areas the enemy is extremely suspicious and cautious . . . in the woods he is cunning and knows well how to move about. In fortress fighting he has also proven his worth, and has quickly adjusted himself to the new situation . . . American artillery is very accurate, and dispose of sufficient ammunition to be able to fire on individual soldiers, messengers, motorcyclists etc . . . the tanks are excellently camouflaged so that frequently they cannot be recognized even at close range . . . The enemy has excellent communications up to the very front lines.”
The Division was assigned its mission . . . the main effort in the drive to encircle the impregnable fortress of Metz, the drive to cross the German frontier, the drive to smash into the heart of Naziland.
This was the plan . . .